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Abstract
Background: A conflict of interest (CoI) can occur between public duty and private interest, in which a public
official’s private-capacity interest could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and
responsibilities.
The most tangible and commonly considered CoI are financial. However, CoI can also arise due to other
types of influence including interpersonal relationships, career progression, or ideology. CoI thus exist in
academia, business, government and non-governmental organisations.
However, public knowledge of CoI is currently limited due to a lack of information. The mechanisms of
managing potential conflicts of interest also remain unclear due to a lack of guidelines.
We therefore examined the independence of academic experts and how well potential CoI are identified
and addressed in four government and non-governmental organisations in the UK responsible for the
development of food policy.
Methods: Policy analysis. We developed an analytical framework to explore CoI in high-level UK food policy
advice, using four case studies. Two government policy-making bodies: Department of Health ‘Obesity Review
Group’ (ORG), ‘Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition’ (SACN) and two charities: ‘Action on Sugar’ (AoS),
& ‘Heart of Mersey’ (HoM).
Information was obtained from publicly available sources and declarations. We developed a five point ordinal
scale based upon the ideology of the Nolan Principles of Public Life. Group members were individually
categorised on the ordinal ConScale from “0”, (complete independence from the food and drink industry)
to “4”, (employed by the food and drink industry or a representative organisation).
Results: CoI involving various industries have long been evident in policy making, academia and clinical
practice. Suggested approaches for managing CoI could be categorised as “deny”, “describe”, or “diminish”.
Declared CoI were common in the ORG and SACN. 4 out of 28 ORG members were direct industry
employees. In SACN 11 out of 17 members declared industry advisory roles or industry research funding.
The two charities appeared to have equally strong academic expertise but fewer conflicts. No HoM members
declared CoI. 5 out of 21 AoS members declared links with industry, mainly pharmaceutical companies. We
were unable to obtain information on conflicts for some individuals.
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Conclusions: Conflicts of interest are unavoidable but potentially manageable.
Government organisations responsible for policy development and implementation must institutionalize an
approach to identify (disclose) and manage (mitigate or eliminate) perceived and actual CoI to improve
public confidence in government decision-making relevant to food policy.
Keywords: Policy, Food, Industry, Government, Conflict of interests, Declaration, Finance, Advice
Background
A conflict of interest (CoI) may occur when professional
judgment or decisions concerning a primary interest
may be unduly influenced by a secondary interest [1].
In relation to public officials, a conflict of interest can
occur between public duty and private interest, in which
the official’s private-capacity interest could improperly
influence the performance of their official duties and
responsibilities [2]. CoI can arise in different contexts and
thus can be defined in different ways. CoI relate to finan-
cial interests, when an individual’s personal finances may
be affected by a decision that he or she has a role in mak-
ing. Alternatively, non-financial issues—such as personal
relationships, business associations, and membership in
political or other groups—might make it difficult for an
individual to consider policy questions objectively. Ideo-
logical conflicts can also occur, for example a more liber-
tarian view that emphasizes individual choice versus a
concern with the broader social impact of those choices.
In this instance, it is often more difficult to distinguish
“conflicts of interest” that should be avoided from “policy
disagreements” that should be addressed in the actions of
public office [3].
A conflicted expert will not necessarily be less objective
than a non-conflicted counterpart [4]. However, logical
concerns are supported by extensive psychological re-
search [5–7] plus empirical data from the tobacco, alcohol,
pharmaceutical and medical device industries. Reviews,
including a recent Cochrane meta-analysis [8] show that
an individual with financial or other links to a company
will likely favour that corporation, consciously or subcon-
sciously [8–14]. Poor methodology and publication bias
are commonplace in industry funded research [10, 14].
Industry funded literature reviews are also known to be
susceptible to industry influence from CoI [9, 15, 16]. Be-
tween March and October 2015, Nestle identified 76 in-
dustry funded food and nutrition studies. Of these 70
reported results favourable to the sponsors [14].
The National Audit Office state that “departments and
agencies should have a code of ethics or code of conduct.
These standards should define what behaviours and prac-
tices are acceptable and unacceptable, and should clearly
state what will happen when people do not comply.” They
also raise the issue of the potential risk of a legal challenge
to decisions made by public bodies. If a decision-maker
has a conflict of interest then the decision is potentially
vulnerable and could be overturned on judicial review
[17]. CoI are concerning and should be examined in order
to ensure objectivity is maintained and those in public of-
fice are open to scrutiny. Identifying and preventing or re-
solving CoI situations is crucial to good governance and
maintaining trust in government decisions and policy.
Applying the CoI label does not imply that the con-
flicted expert is necessarily guilty of collusion or corrup-
tion. However, current or past financial or personal
associations with interested parties make it difficult to
distinguish subtle, unconscious bias from deliberately
concealed impropriety. Being ‘conflicted’ thus also means
‘potentially conflicted’, as the term can be applied before
key events, such as decision-making or research pub-
lication. Perceived CoI are also important, potentially
tarnishing the reputation of scientists, organisations
or corporations [2, 17, 18]. This then offers scope for
preventive measures.
In the UK, The Nolan Principles of Public Life [19]
(Table 1) demand standards of professional conduct and
integrity for public officials. In use since 1995, these prin-
ciples aim to combat the risks (bias towards financial,
business/industry interests), that CoI pose to procedures
conducted for the public good. Neglecting the application
of these principles could foreseeably cause a great number
of problems, in terms of objectivity and accountability,
both politically and for evidence-based public health.
However, it is less clear whether central UK government
routinely follows these principles when eliciting advice on
food policy.
Public health policy in England comes mainly from the
Department of Health (DH). The DH has successfully
implemented strategies on tobacco control, alcohol,
physical activity and food [20, 21]. Currently, high rates
of obesity and diabetes in adults and children in the UK
have recently fuelled increasing concern about sugar in-
take [22–24]. Government food policy is now under in-
creasing scrutiny [13].
However, any regulation or tax on sugar would poten-
tially threaten transnational corporations’ sales and profits.
Industry opposition might therefore be predicted using a
variety of denialism tactics, including influencing scientific
researchers, and hence the expert advice given to policy
makers [8].
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Gornell uncovered a “tangled web” of connections
between the sugar industry and UK government advisory
bodies with key public health experts involved with the
sugar industry and related companies responsible for
many of the products blamed for the obesity crisis through
research grants, consultancy fees, and other forms of fund-
ing [25]. Some of the experts whose reputations were
publicly questioned subsequently responded to defend
these allegations [26], however the concern is that a CoI
may bias behaviour, and it is the potential for bias that
makes CoI important [27].
Many governments are now emphasizing public/private
partnerships [28–30], resulting in closer ties to industry.
Subsequent CoI are becoming increasingly common
within decision-making groups. By influencing the aca-
demic evidence base and subsequent discussion in policy
making groups, powerful corporations with vested inter-
ests and considerable public, political and media influence
are well positioned to lobby governments. This can cause
governments to base policy not on nutrition and public
health effects of their products but on wealth creation
and the financial and employment potential of their
companies.
The normalisation of public/private partnerships has
generally fostered a relaxed attitude towards the impact
of CoI [31]. Indeed, many at risk individuals claim that
CoI are unlikely to cause problems [32, 33]. Academics
aspire to be independent and objective, but they are also
human, and therefore vulnerable to potential CoI.
Adams (2007) suggests the concept of a ‘continuum’
of moral jeopardy is preferable to a ‘binary’ interpret-
ation, [34] with a scale ranging from those with minor
involvements to those with unmanageable conflicts of
interest. He suggests active scrutiny of these risks can
be assisted through strategies that promote ongoing
self-assessment [34]. Many academics assert that their
academic integrity and self-assessment will nullify any
potential bias from commercial CoI [35]. However, the
evidence shows otherwise. CoI have been consistently
linked to biased outcomes, which compromise the quality
of academic evidence and undermine supposedly ‘evidence
based’ decisions [11–14].
Although the full influence of industry is not known, it
is possible that high-level food policy decisions in the
UK may be affected by corporate attempts to influ-
ence policy. This has certainly been highlighted in pa-
pers by Moodie [8], Stuckler [36] and most recently
by Gornall [25].
However, public knowledge of CoI is currently limited
due to a lack of information and the complexity of this
issue. The mechanisms for identifying and managing po-
tential conflicts of interest also remain unclear [2, 17, 18].
We therefore examined four contrasting governmental
and non-governmental organisations in the UK respon-
sible for developing food policy based on current re-
search (The Department of Health ‘Obesity Review
Group’ (ORG), The ‘Scientific Advisory Committee on
Nutrition’ (SACN) and two charities: ‘Action on Sugar’
(AoS), and ‘Heart of Mersey’ (HoM) (Additional file 1:
Appendices 1 - 6). All four use academic topic experts to
give advice and help formulate public policy. We asked:
How independent of industry influence are these aca-
demic “experts” and how well are potential conflicts of
interest identified and addressed?
Methods
We examined potential CoI in four case studies: two
government policy-making bodies and, as possible exem-
plars, two charities, one food-based and one promoting
cardiovascular health:
1. The ‘Obesity Review Group’ (ORG), an arm’s length
advisory group to the DH.
2. The Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition
(SACN), a committee advising Public Health
England and the government on food matters.
Table 1 The Nolan principles of public life
Principle Explanation
Selflessness Holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other
benefits for themselves, their family or their friends
Integrity Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations
that might seek to influence them in the performance of their official duties
Objectivity In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for
rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit
Accountability Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever
scrutiny is appropriate to their office
Openness Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons
for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands
Honesty Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any
conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest
Leadership Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example
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3. ‘Action on Sugar’ (AoS), a non-governmental public
interest campaigning charity.
4. ‘Heart of Mersey’ (HoM), an independent regional
cardiovascular health charity.
All groups were chosen from the UK because all authors
are based in the UK and are therefore most familiar with
UK public health groups/structures and methods of policy
generation. As there are relatively few leading organisa-
tions specifically involved in UK food policy there were
not many options to choose from. We hoped to maximise
contrast between groups in our analysis, using two which
are close to government and two non-governmental, third
sector organisations. We therefore chose ORG, SACN,
AoS and HoM: a governmental organisation, an organisa-
tion ‘at arm’s-length’ from the government plus a national
and a regional charity.
The membership of each advisory group was deter-
mined via the organisation website, with initial data on
potential conflicts being obtained through personal biog-
raphies on organisation and employer websites or net-
working sites such as LinkedIn.
CoI declarations were identified through systematic Goo-
gle and Google Scholar searches. Sources included publicly
accessible CoI records, minutes of public office meetings
and academic publications. CoI declarations used in this
analysis are detailed in Additional file 1: Appendices 2 - 7.
Data were collated in a Microsoft Excel database of
CoI relating to food policy. Only ‘recent’ CoI declara-
tions (last 5 years) were included. Institutions differ on
the length of time for which past interests must be
declared, usually between 1-10 years depending on
the nature of the conflict and reason for declaration.
Each member of each group was then categorised on a
five point ordinal ConScale (Table 2). The ConScale was
conceived and trialled by the authors as a method of
differentiating between levels of conflict in individuals.
Scores range from “0”, (indicating complete independ-
ence from the food and drink industry) to “4”, (an em-
ployee of the food and drink industry or representative
organisation) or ‘unknown’ if there was a complete ab-
sence of CoI declarations for the individual.
Individuals score “0” if all declarations report no CoI.
A score of “1” represents receipt of industry hospitality.
‘Hospitality’ can cover a broad spectrum in CoI declara-
tions, but is taken to mean expenses - accommodation,
meals, travel or entertainment – beyond what is reason-
ably required [37]. In CoI declarations it is routine to
declare ‘hospitality’, without differentiating further. We
therefore considered it suitable to do the same in our
analysis.
A score of “2” is given for receipt of funding for
research. Acting in a consultancy role or being a share-
holder in a relevant industry scores “3”. The highest
score of “4” is reserved for individuals primarily employed
by industry or representing the commercial interests of
industry.
Stronger links to industry indicated by higher scores
increase the dependence of the individual on the corpor-
ation and increases a conscious or sub-conscious suppos-
ition of reciprocity to those who have benefitted them.
Levels of dependence and reciprocity may vary circum-
stantially. Therefore, the level of perceived conflict and
moral questionability of interacting with industry can
change accordingly along a spectrum. The impact of a
conflict due to research funding may in some cases be
much greater than that of a conflict due to consultancy.
Equally, some indirect CoI may have more impact than
direct conflicts. However, any overarching classification
system is not able to take account of such variability.
Importantly, the level of conflict perceived by the public is
unlikely to alter due to such circumstances.
Results
Four case studies in UK food policy (Fig. 1) (Additional
file 1: Appendices 2 - 6)
There was surprisingly little information publicly avail-
able on the interests of members in the four bodies exam-
ined. This was particularly evident for non-academic
members. Data were often difficult to find, opaque and
Table 2 Proposed scoring system (ConScores) for members of advisory groups
ConScore
0 (100 % Independent of industry) 1 2 3 4
(Industry Employee)
Zero interaction
Received hospitality Received hospitality Received hospitality Received hospitality
Research Funding Research Funding Research Funding
Consultancy Consultancy
Industry Shareholder Industry Shareholder
Employed by food company
Employed by organisation representing industry
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hence difficult to interpret. Each group contained at least
one member with no publicly available CoI declarations.
Declared CoI were common in the Obesity Review
Group (ORG). Four out of 28 of the members were direct
employees of industry. Five members were paid consul-
tants for the food and drink industry, of which one was
also an industry shareholder. Two members had an un-
known level of conflict. Furthermore, there are no re-
cords of CoI declarations published by the ORG or
evidence of declarations of interest within the minutes
of meetings [38, 39].
The Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition (SACN)
hold full CoI declarations for all members which are
published in their annual report, part of an extensive,
publicly accessible catalogue of reports and meeting
minutes. However, 9 out of 17 SACN members de-
clared advisory roles for industry and 2 out of 17 mem-
bers declared receiving research funding from industry.
The group also includes 4 industry shareholders and
one member is primarily employed as a ‘science leader’
in the research and development department at Unile-
ver. One member, the lay member of the group, had no
identifiable declarations of interest. Neither of the two
charities had any members employed directly by indus-
try. Five of 21 members of Action on Sugar (AoS),
declared financial links with industry. Three of these
were related to pharmaceutical industries, two who
were paid for past consultancy work and one member
who was categorised as conflicted due to holding pat-
ents for a medication to prevent cardiovascular dis-
ease. One AoS member had no publicly available CoI
declarations. No Heart of Mersey (HoM) members
declared any ties to industry, although 3 out of 12
members had no publicly available declarations. HoM ex-
plicitly claim adherence to the Nolan Principles of Public
Life (Table 3).
Discussion
Based on our rapid literature review (Additional file 1:
Appendix 8), approaches for managing conflicts of
interest could be categorised as either ‘deny’, (ignore or
conceal) ‘describe’ (document then dismiss) or ‘diminish’
(actively identify, minimise or prevent) (Table 3). These
categories can be applied to the four case studies. We
suggest that this analytical framework of categorising
approaches to managing CoI might be useful in future
studies and practice.
Despite repeated calls for transparency, there was sur-
prisingly little information available on the ORG mem-
bers’ interests. Even with the limited information found,
many members were conflicted, including four individ-
uals directly employed by industry. It follows that the
ORG approach to CoI is to ‘deny’, that is to conceal or
ignore any existing CoI.
SACN are more transparent, thus more revealing,
clearly demonstrating a ‘describe’ strategy. Commendably,
the group records and publishes declarations of interest
by group members annually and minutes of SACN meet-
ings are also published online. Analysis of the minutes
from the last 5 years show that attendees are routinely
obliged to declare any new conflicts at the start of each
meeting. However, there is scant mention of action taken
to remove conflicts from decision making processes
other than a retroactive statement following a negative
media reporting of potential conflicts within the group
(Additional file 1: Appendix 9).
AoS and particularly HoM comprise notably fewer con-
flicted individuals. It is possible that the AoS Chair felt
that links to the pharmaceutical industry were unlikely to
conflict advice on sugary drinks or processed foods. HoM
in particular appear to demonstrate that comparable
experts with minimal CoI exist and are available.
Fig. 1 Conflicts of interest within advisory groups
Table 3 Proposed typology of management of conflicts of
interest
Standpoint Suggested management Number of studies
recommending
suggested
management
%
Deny Do Nothing 4 15
Increase Self-Regulation and/or
Professional Standards
11 42
Describe Education on CoI 5 19
Improve Transparency 21 81
Introduce Central Repository for
industry Funding
3 12
Standard CoI Policy Across Multiple
Centres/Disciplines
4 15
Diminish Prevent/Limit Industry Interaction 15 58
Independent Non-Conflicted
Group to Review CoI
11 42
Sanctions for Those Who Breach
Policy
2 8
Newton et al. BMC Public Health  (2016) 16:735 Page 5 of 8
Both charities appear to make some efforts to ‘diminish’
CoI while maintaining equally strong or even greater aca-
demic expertise. However, both of these groups are less
procedurally transparent than SACN. This should be
improved to prove a commitment to actively identifying,
minimising and preventing CoI.
The ORG and SACN are public health bodies focussed
on improving population health by advising on nutrition
and health related issues. Both therefore need to com-
mand total public confidence in their procedures as well
as their products. Although a “Describe” strategy might be
better than a “Deny” approach, neither provide adequate
public safeguards. Merely documenting an individual’s
widespread industrial interests is neither convincing nor
adequate. To then assert that “no further action” is re-
quired clearly undermines the perceived objectivity of the
expert advice and erodes public confidence.
Prescriptive mechanisms to “Diminish” conflicts are
clearly required if ORG and SACN wish to manage CoI
effectively and convincingly. Current practice is thus
falling far short of the strong recommendations made in
the literature.
The Nolan Principles (Table 1) potentially provide a
practical and effective solution to help policy makers ac-
tively manage any CoI, whether current or perceived.
These Principles are increasingly seen as good practice
models for management of CoI [40]. Specifically, their ap-
plication would exclude academic experts associated with
industry funding on any policy advisory panel on the basis
of “Selflessness”, “Integrity”, and “Objectivity”. Yet, where
these principles should be followed most stringently,
within the UK government, they appear to be overlooked.
Media exposure of professionals who accept funding
to support nutrition research is increasing government
pressure for UK reform to address CoI [25, 41]. Inter-
nationally, there is also increasing unease over the influ-
ence of powerful corporations. Founded in 2011, the
‘Conflicts of Interest Coalition’, representing over 160 re-
gional, national and international networks and organi-
sations united by the common objective of safeguarding
public health policy-making against commercial conflicts
of interest through the development of a Code of
Conduct and Ethical Framework for interactions with
the private sector, released a ‘Statement of Concern’
[42]. The coalition has called on the World Health
Organization (WHO) to further ‘safeguard public health
policy from commercial influence’ [43] and to ‘stop
blurring the distinctions between actors who share the
primary interest with WHO and those whose primary
interest is market-led’ [44]. In response to this call,
WHO are now in the process of finalising a ‘Framework
of engagement with non-State actors’ [45].
Yet, the recent UK government, like some other
countries [46, 47] has increased industry involvement
in policy making through public private partnerships
and the ‘Responsibility Deal’ [48]. Concerns about the
nature of these relationships have been raised but ig-
nored [49–52]. Yet such partnership approaches and
voluntary agreements enable corporations, whose primary
interest is profit, to dilute or delay more effective policies
implemented by government to promote public health,
such as regulation or taxation [48, 49, 53].
In October 2015 the WHO convened a technical con-
sultation to address and manage conflicts of interest in
the planning and delivery of nutrition programmes at
the country level. The consultation paper recommended
that institutions should emphasize the prevention of CoI
rather than their management. The paper offers proposed
indicators for a variety of topics including obesity and
NCDs, and recommends several pre-requisites prior to
government or non-governmental organisations engaging
with private-sector actors who may unduly influence food
and nutrition policy processes and outcomes. Further-
more, the WHO consultation enabled ideologically diverse
actors to come together and help lead to reciprocity to
foster an enabling environment for CoI to evolve.
There are various publications in the grey literature
which attempt to address the strengths and weaknesses
of existing approaches to identify, manage and mitigate
CoI. These publications provide valuable guidance for
preventing and addressing CoI, whilst at the same time
demonstrating the complexities involved for individuals
and organisations in ensuring impartiality [2, 17, 18, 54].
Our study indicates that conflicts of interest exist in
organisations directly involved with influencing UK food
policy. Declared CoI were common in both UK govern-
ment food policy bodies reviewed, the Scientific Advis-
ory Body on Nutrition (SACN) and the Obesity Review
Group (ORG). Both SACN and the ORG include indi-
viduals directly employed by the food industry.
Limitations
Perhaps the main limitation of the case studies was the
patchy and probably incomplete data on individuals’ in-
terests in the four bodies analysed. Reporting standards
were very variable. Some individuals, particularly those
outside of academia, had no publicly searchable informa-
tion whatsoever. CoI declarations for academics were
more accessible but still neither exhaustive nor consistent.
Furthermore, we did not contact individual members of
each group or conduct systematic Freedom of Information
requests. Under estimation of CoI is thus likely.
We created and piloted a five point ordinal ConScale
from “0”, (indicating complete independence from the
food and drink industry) to “4”, (an employee of the food
and drink industry or a representative organisation).
While manifesting good face validity, more formal evalu-
ation and validation is now indicated.
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Due to limitations of time and resources we were re-
stricted to documenting potential CoI rather than deter-
mining their impact on food policy. Further research
would benefit from using the ConScale to explore the
relationship between the organisation’s individual and
aggregate CoI scores and the decisions that were reached.
All four case studies examined UK-based food policy
influencers. Future analyses might consider analysing
larger numbers of diverse organisations from a variety of
high middle and low income countries [36].
Implications for further research and for future health
policy
This exploratory study highlights some key issues sur-
rounding CoI in policy making and thus identifies import-
ant topics for future research. This study demonstrates an
urgent need to increase the availability of data to assure
public confidence in the integrity of policy making groups.
There is potential value in a mandatory public register of
public servants’ CoI declarations, a strategy strongly pro-
moted within the literature.
The scarcity of literature regarding CoI in policy makers
was surprising. We found none specifically concerning
academic experts advising on food policy. Future projects
might examine a wider range of groups that influence
public health policy making. Ideally these investigations
would all be reinforced by Freedom of Information re-
quests followed by invitations enabling each individual
group member to comment. The “National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, US” model recently
adapted by NICE requiring a neutral chair [55] might
also be formally evaluated. While this analysis is lim-
ited to UK organisations, the principles of this study
and the implications outlined above may be cautiously
generalizable elsewhere.
Conclusions
Conflicts of interest are unavoidable if organisations
wish to enlist a representative spectrum of experts to
advise on evidence-based policies. However, they are
potentially manageable if guidelines such as The Nolan
Principles of Public Life are adhered to. Government
organisations responsible for policy development and
implementation must institutionalize an approach to
identify (disclose) and manage (mitigate or ideally elim-
inate) perceived and actual CoI to improve public con-
fidence in government decision-making relevant to
food policy.
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